

Cryptography in a Quantum World

Scientific Introduction to the Winter School

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Quantum Computing & Computer Science

Quantum Computing: Use physical principles of quantum mechanics to achieve new computational capabilities

Potential Applications: Simulate quantum systems, generate randomness (locally or jointly), improved algorithms (factoring, lattice, ML)

Race towards full-fledged ("fault tolerant") quantum computer. Current technology noisy with specialized architecture ("NISQ era")

More philosophically: Computational perspective on a quantum universe

Implications: Refuting (?) the Extended Church-Turing hypothesis, characterization of possible correlations without communication, black-hole information paradox (using crypto!), quantum gravity (using crypto!)



Credit: Event Horizon Telescope

Quantum Computing & Cryptography

If QC is a valid computational model, what are the implications on cryptography?

- **Assumptions** get broken quantumly (“Q cryptanalysis”)
- **Adversarial models** still valid?
- **Reductions** still hold?
- Some **techniques** are inapplicable. Is this inherent?

Even for **classical** crypto primitives (w/ Q adversary)

a.k.a “post-quantum” cryptography


Quantum Computing & Cryptography

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- **New cryptographic objects**
 - Enc/Sig/MPC/Obf/... for quantum data
 - C-Q interaction (e.g. delegation)
 - Pseudorandomness for Q objects
- New crypto **capabilities** from Q information (QKD, MPC in QMiniCrypt)
- Q crypto as perspective on physical phenomena

What is the School About?

Focus on foundations: Basic challenges and techniques for Crypto in a Q world

- ~~- Assumptions get broken quantumly (“Q cryptanalysis”)~~ Will not cover constructing QC or standardization of PQ crypto
- **Adversarial models** still valid?
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- ~~- Q crypto as perspective on physical phenomena~~

Outline of the School

Crash Course in Quantum Computing


by Henry Yuen (Columbia University)



- Basic quantum information
 - What is a qubit?
 - Unitary evolution, measurements.
 - Composite quantum systems
 - No Cloning Theorem
 - Measurement in different bases, partial measurements
- Quantum circuits and quantum computation
 - Quantum circuit model
 - Algorithms: Grover, Quantum Fourier Transform
- Advanced quantum information theory
 - BQP, QMA, Hamiltonians
 - Mixed states
 - Distinguishability of quantum states (trace distance)


Quantum Key-Distribution (QKD)

by Rotem Arnon-Friedman (Weizmann Institute of Science)



Classically: requires computational assumptions
at least OWFs, but seemingly much more...

Quantum Key-Distribution (QKD)



Quantumly: no assumptions (but quantum mechanics)

The technology is already out there!

QKD: Topics (Tentative)

by Rotem Arnon-Friedman (Weizmann Institute of Science)

- Defining
- Constructing
- Proving security
 - Quantum uncertainty relations
- Amplifying privacy
 - Quantum-proof randomness extractors
- Device independence (don't trust that your device is quantum)
 - Non-local games

Post-quantum Security, Beyond Assumptions

by Mark Zhandry (Princeton University and NTT Research)



classical
primitives

classical
adversary

classical
primitives

**quantum
adversary**

PRG


PRF

Signatures

CPA Encryption

CCA

...



Definitions

Constructions

Reductions

PQ Assumptions

Post-quantum Security, Beyond Assumptions

Q: how does the quantum adversary interact with the classical system?

Example: is any lattice-based PRF PQ secure?

Not,

if the adversary can query it in **superposition!**

Some constructions (e.g., GGM) are PQ secure

Different security reduction...

PQ Security, Beyond Assumptions: Topics (Tentative)

by Mark Zhandry (Princeton University and NTT Research)

- When does PQ security follow directly?
- When does it break?
- How can we fix it?
- Topics:
 - Superposition queries
 - Quantum random oracle model
 - Rewinding

Zero-Knowledge and MPC in a Quantum World

by Alex Grilo (CNRS / Sorbonne Université)




The diagram illustrates a logical equivalence between two statements. In the center is the text "G is 3-colorable". To the left of this text is a large, bold black letter 'P'. To the right is a large, bold black letter 'V'. A horizontal double-headed arrow connects the 'P' and 'V' symbols, indicating that the two statements are equivalent. Below the 'P' symbol, the text "knows a coloring" is written in black. Below the 'V' symbol, the text "learns nothing" is written in red.

Classically: doable for all of NP from OWFs.


Quantum Verifier (Classical Protocol)

PQ zero knowledge?



Still doable, requires quantum rewinding

Multi-Party Computation: Quantum Adversary



PQ Oblivious Transfer + ZK => PQ MPC

If parties are (mildly) quantum: **OWF suffice!**


ZK and MPC: Topics (Tentative)

by Alex Grilo (CNRS / Sorbonne Université)

- Classical ZK protocols against quantum verifiers for NP
- Quantum ZK protocols for QMA (quantum analog of NP)
- Quantum MPC protocols from OWF (classical computations).
- Quantum MPQC (quantum computations).

Delegation of Quantum Computation


by Thomas Vidick (California Institute of Technology)



Soundness: client should be able to verify correctness

Privacy: client input x remains hidden (aka blindness)

Features



Delegation of Q Computation: Topics (Tentative)

by Thomas Vidick (California Institute of Technology)

- Information-theoretic security, quantum client.
- IT security, classical client, two servers.
- Computational security, **classical client, single server.**
- Tools:
 - Quantum one-time pad
 - Authentication using Clifford gates
 - Quantum homomorphic encryption
 - Self testing
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Enjoy!