

Session 8: Constructions for Specific Functions of Interest

Benny Pinkas
Bar Ilan University

Correction



Extending OT [IKNP]

- Is fully simulatable
- Depends on a non-standard security assumption "correlation robust" functions
 - Modern hash families should have this property
- Security against malicious adversaries is based on the "cut and choose" approach
 - Increases the overhead by a factor of s to reduce cheating probability to 2^{-s}.

How efficient is Yao's protocol?



- Example: the millionaires problem comparing two N bit numbers
- What's the overhead?
 - Circuit size is linear in N
 - N oblivious transfers

Other applications



- Two parties. Two large data sets.
- Example applications
 - Computing the Max?
 - Mean?
 - Median?
 - Intersection?

How efficient is <u>generic</u> secure computation?



- If the circuit is not too large then generic secure two-party computation is efficient
- AES (key and plaintext are known to Alice and Bob, respectively) [PSSW09]
 - About 33,000 gates
 - 7/60/1114 sec for semi-honest/covert/malicious
- If the circuit is large: we currently need adhoc solutions.



Secure Computation of the Median

G. Aggarwal, N. Mishra and B. Pinkas, *Secure Computation of the K'th-ranked Element*, Eurocrypt'04.

kth-ranked element (e.g. median)



Inputs:

• Alice: S_A Bob: S_R Large sets of **unique** items ($\in D$).

Output:

• $x \in S_A \cup S_B$ s.t. x has k-1 elements smaller than it.

The median

$$\cdot k = (|S_A| + |S_R|) / 2$$

Motivation:

- Basic statistical analysis of distributed data.
- E.g., histogram of salaries.

Some information is always revealed



- The kth-ranked element reveals some information.
- Suppose $S_A = X_1, ..., X_{1000}$ (sorted)
 - Median of $S_A \cup S_B = x_{400}$
- Party A now learns that S_B contains at least 200 elements smaller than x_{400}
- But she shouldn't learn more

Using a generic solution...




The Problem:

- The size of a circuit for computing the kth ranked element is at least linear in k.
- For the median, k is in the same order as the size of the inputs.
- Generic constructions using circuits [Yao,...] have communication complexity which is linear in the circuit size, and therefore in k.

An (insecure) two-party median protocol






 L_A lies below the median, R_B lies above the median. $|L_A| = |R_B|$

New median is same as original median!

Recursion → Need log n rounds (assume each set contains n=2ⁱ items)


A Secure two-party median protocol






An example












- This is a proof of security for the case of semi-honest adversaries.
- Security for malicious adversaries is more complex.
 - The protocol must be changed to ensure that the parties' answers are consistent with some input.
 - Also, the comparison of the medians must be done by a protocol secure against malicious adversaries.

Arbitrary input size, arbitrary k





Now, compute the median of two sets of size k.


Size should be a power of 2.

median of new inputs $= k^{th}$ element of original inputs

Hiding size of inputs



- Can search for kth element without revealing size of input sets.
- ▶ However, k=n/2 (median) reveals input size.
- Solution: Let $S=2^i$ be a bound on input size.



Median of new datasets is same as median of original datasets

A Protocol secure against malicious adversaries



- The parties can choose arbitrary inputs to the comparisons.
- For example,
 - In Step 1 claim that $m_A=100$, and be told that $m_A < m_R$ (therefore A must remove all items $\le mA$).
 - In step 2 claim that $m_A = 10...$
- We change the protocol so that even if input values are chosen adaptively during the protocol, they correspond to a valid input that can be sent to the TTP.

Protocol secure against malicious adversaries



The modified protocol:

- Initialize bounds $L_A = L_B = -\infty$, $U_A = U_B = \infty$.
- Each comparison protocol must be secure against malicious parties and verify that
 - $L_{\Delta} < m_{\Delta} < U_{\Delta}$
 - $L_R < m_R < U_R$
- If the verification succeeds, then
 - If $m_A \ge m_B$ then set $U_A = m_A$ and $L_B = m_B$
 - Otherwise set $L_A = m_A$ and $U_R = m_R$

The bounds ensure that m_A and m_R are consistent with previous inputs



Implementing the secure computation




- The bounds L_A, L_B, U_A, U_B must not be revealed to any party, but rather be internal values of the secure computation.
- The secure computation is run in phases, where each phase must pass updated values of L_A, L_B, U_A, U_B to the next phase.
- Can be implemented using reactive computation
- Or, in a simpler way...

Implementing the secure computation



- The circuit is composed of layers.
- Each layer provides an external output, and has internal wires going into the next layer.



Implementing reactive computation




- In each layer
 - provide A with
 - Shares of L_A,U_A,L_B,U_B
 - MACs of B's shares of these values
 - provide B with
 - Shares of L_A,U_A,L_B,U_B
 - MACs of A's shares of these values

In the next level

- A and B inputs these values.
- The circuit checks the MACs, and reconstructs L_A,U_A,L_B,U_B from shares.




- Must show that for every adversary A' in real model there is a simulator A'' in the ideal model, etc...
- The operation of A' in the real model can be visualized as following a path in a binary tree.






- If A' does not provide a legitimate input to a comparison (namely $m_A \notin (L_A, U_A)$) then the simulator aborts.
- Assume that the random input of A' is known to the simulator, and therefore A' is deterministic.





- The simulator runs the protocol with A', rewinding over all execution paths in the tree.
- Learns the inputs of A' to all comparisons. The inputs to the leaves correspond to the sorted input of A'.
- The simulator sends this input to TTP. Based on the result, it simulates the real execution path with A'.



The multi-party case



- Input: Party P_i has set S_i, i=1..n. (all values ∈[a,b], where a and b are known)
- Output: k^{th} element of $S_1 \cup ... \cup S_n$
- Protocol (binary search): Set m = (b-a)/2. Repeat:
 - P_i uses the following input for a secure computation:
 - $L_i = \#$ elements in S_i smaller than m.
 - $B_i = \#$ times m appears in S_i .
 - The following is computed securely:
 - If $\Sigma L_i \ge k$, set b=m, m=(m-a)/2, else
 - If $\Sigma(L_i + B_i) \ge k$, stop. k^{th} element is m.
 - Otherwise, set a=m, m = m+(b-m)/2.

Conclusion



- Efficient secure computation of the median.
 - Two-party: log k rounds * O(log D)
 - Multi-party: log D rounds * O(log D)
 - Very close to the communication complexity lower bound of log D bits.
- Malicious case is efficient too.
 - Do not use generic tools.
 - Instead, implement simple consistency checks.



Private matching and set intersection

M. Freedman, K. Nissim and B. Pinkas, *Efficient Private Matching and Set Intersection*, Eurocrypt'04.

The Scenario







Input:

$$X = X_1 \dots X_n$$

 $Y = y_1 \dots y_n$

Output:

$$X \cap Y$$
 only

nothing

- Shared interests (research, music)
- Credit rating
- Sharing intelligence between agencies (IARPA)
- Dating
- Genetic compatibility, etc

Implementation by a circuit?



- Trivial circuit compares each (x_i,y_i) pair
 - O(n²) circuit size
- A more advanced circuit:
 - Sort the union of the two sets, using a sorting network.
 - If $x_i = y_i$ these two values will become adjacent.
 - Scan and search for identical adjacent values
 - O(nlogn) circuit size (with huge constant [AKS])

Basic tool: Additively homomorphic encryption



- Public key encryption, such that
 - Given E(x) it is possible to compute, without knowledge of the secret key, the value of $E(c \cdot x)$, for every c.
 - Given E(x) and E(y), it is possible to compute E(x+y).
- We will use the notation
 - \circ E(x) \cdot E(y) = E(x+y)
 - \circ E(x)^c =E(c·x)
- Applications
 - Voting
 - Many cryptographic protocols, such as keyword search, oblivious transfer...

Background on homomorphic encryption



- "Standard" public key encryption schemes support Homomorphic operations with relation to multiplication
 - RSA
 - Public key: N, e. Private key: d.
 - $E(m) = m^e \mod N$
 - $E(m_1) \cdot E(m_2) = E(m_1 \cdot m_2)$
 - El Gamal
 - Public key: p (or a similar group), $y=g^x$. Private key: x.
 - $E(m) = (g^r, y^r m)$
 - $E(m_1) \cdot E(m_2) = E(m_1 \cdot m_2)$

Background on additively homomorphic encryption



Modified El Gamal

- $E(m) = (g^r, y^r g^m)$
- $E(m_1) \cdot E(m_2) = (g^r, y^r g^{m_1 + m_2}) = E(m_1 + m_2)$
- Decryption reveals g^m₁ + m₂
- Computing $m_1 + m_2$ is possible if $m_1 + m_2$ is small

Paillier's cryptosystem

- Based on composite residuocity classes
- Works in the group $Z^*_{n^2}$, where n=pq.
- "Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree Residuosity Classes", Pascal Paillier, Eurocrypt'99.

The protocol (semi-honest case)



Client (C) defines a polynomial of degree n whose roots are her inputs x₁,...,x_n

$$P(y) = (x_1-y)(x_2-y)...(x_k-y) = a_0 + a_1y + ... + a_ky^k$$

 C sends to server (S) homomorphic encryptions of polynomial's coefficients

$$Enc(a_0),..., Enc(a_k)$$

The protocol



Note that

- $Enc(P(y)) = Enc(a_0 + a_1 \cdot y^1 + ... + a_k \cdot y^k) =$ $Enc(a_0) \cdot Enc(a_1)^y \cdot Enc(a_2)^{y^2} \cdot ... \cdot Enc(a_k)^{y^k}$
- Therefore $\forall y$, server can compute Enc(P(y))
- The operation of the server
 - $\forall y_j$, choose random r_j and compute $Enc(r_j \cdot P(y_j) + y_j)$
 - This equals Enc(y_j) if y_j ∈ X, and is random otherwise.
 - S sends (permuted) results back to C
 - C decrypts and learns X∩Y

Variants of the basic protocol



- The server computes $Enc(r_j \cdot P(y_j) + 1)$
 - This equals Enc(1) if $y_j \in X$, and is random otherwise.
 - The client decrypts, counts the number of 1's and learns $|X \cap Y|$.
- A different variant enables to compute whether |intersection| > threshold.

Security (semi-honest)



Client's privacy

- Server only sees semantically-secure enc's
- We can simulate server's view by sending it enc's of arbitrary values.

Server's privacy

- Client can simulate her view in the protocol, given the output $X \cap Y$ alone:
 - Compute the enc's of items in X
 Y and of random items, and receive them in random order.

Efficiency



- Communication is O(n)
 - C sends n coefficients
 - S sends n evaluations of polynomial
- Computation
 - Client encrypts and decrypts n values
 - Server:
 - $\forall y \in Y$, computes $Enc(r \cdot P(y) + y)$, using n exponentiations
 - Total of O(n²) exponentiations ⊗


Improving Efficiency (1)



- Inputs typically from a "small" domain of D values. Represented by logD bits (say, 20)
- Use Horner's rule to compute polynomial:
 - $P(y) = a_0 + y (a_1 + ... y (a_{n-1} + y a_n) ...)$ instead of $P(y) = a_0 + a_1 y + a_{n-1} y^{n-1} + a_n y^n$
 - Now, exponents are only log D bits
 - Overhead of exponentiation is linear in |exponent|
- → Improvement by factor of |modulus|/log D, e.g., 1024/20≈50

Improving Efficiency (2): Hashing





C uses $H(\cdot)$ to hash inputs to B bins (H indep. of inputs) Let M bound max # of items in a bin.


Client defines B polynomials of deg M.

Each poly encodes x's mapped to its bin.

Improving Efficiency (2): Hashing









$$\forall y \in Y, i \leftarrow H(y), r \leftarrow rand$$

Enc($r \cdot P_i(y) + y$)

- C sends B polynomials and H to server.
- For every y, S computes H(y) and evaluates the corresponding poly (of degree M)

Overhead with Hashing



- ▶ Communication: B·M
- Server: $n \cdot M$ short exp's, n full exp's (P(y)) $(r \cdot P_i(y) + y)$
- How large should M be?
- Simple hashing:
 - If the number of bins is B=n, then M=O(logn)
 - Therefore
 - Communication O(nlogn)
 - Server computation O(nlogn)
 - Can do better...

Overhead with Hashing



- Balanced allocations [ABKU]:
- $H=(h_1,h_2)$: Choose two bins, map item y to the <u>less occupied</u> bin among $h_1(y),h_2(y)$.
- It was shown that for $B = n/\ln \ln n$ the maximum bin size is M=O (ln ln n)
- Communication is BM=O(n)
- Server: n In In n short exp, n full exp. (in practice In In n≤5)
- Client must check results in two bins

Overhead with Hashing




- Cuckoo hashing [Pagh-Rodler]
- Map n items to $B\approx 2n$ bins of size M=1, or to a small stash (of size, say, 3).
- Each item y is found in either $h_1(y)$ or $h_2(y)$, or in the stash.
 - Details of the construction are omitted
- Communication, and server work are only O(n)

Actual run times



- Asymptotic run time of server with random hashing/balanced allocations/Cuckoo hashing is nlogn/nloglogn/n, respectively.
- For n=10,000, actual run times were 48/69/65 seconds, respectively.

????????



Actual run times - what happened?



- Server computes E(r · P(y)+y)
- The overhead of multiplying by r is independent of the degree. It is also a <u>full</u> exponentiation.
 - Experiments showed the overhead of evaluating $E(r \cdot P(y)+y)$ to be linear in d+6.5
- In the different methods S evaluates 1/2/3 polynomials, of degree logn/loglogn/O(1).
- Simple hashing is better since it evaluates a single polynomial.
- The other schemes are better only for larger values of n.