


Session 1: Background and Definitions

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Secure Computation in Practice



- A request from 1 month ago:
 - A nonprofit organization in New York, under contract from the US government is doing research on criminal justice
 - The organization asked the US immigration authorities for the list of "Alien Registration Numbers" of aliens arrested in New York City
 - To see which of them are on their list
 - Neither party can hand over their list due to privacy concerns
- This is secure set intersection

Secure Multiparty Computation



- A set of parties with private inputs
- Parties wish to jointly compute a function of their inputs so that certain security properties are preserved
- Properties must be ensured even if some of the parties maliciously attack the protocol
- Can model any cryptographic task

3

Security Requirements



Consider a secure auction (with secret bids):

- An adversary may wish to learn the bids of all parties – to prevent this, require PRIVACY
- An adversary may wish to win with a lower bid than the highest – to prevent this, require CORRECTNESS
- But, the adversary may also wish to ensure that it always gives the highest bid – to prevent this, require INDEPENDENCE OF INPUTS
- An adversary may try to abort the execution if its bid is not the highest – require FAIRNESS

General Security Properties



- Privacy: only the output is revealed
- Correctness: the function is computed correctly
- Independence of inputs: parties cannot choose inputs based on others' inputs
- Fairness: if one party receives output, all receive output
- Guaranteed output delivery

Defining Security



- Option 1: analyze security concerns for each specific problem
 - Auctions: as in previous slide
 - Elections: privacy, correctness and fairness only (?)

Problems:

- How do we know that all concerns are covered?
- Definitions are application dependent and need to be redefined from scratch for

each task

Defining Security



- Option 2: general definition that captures all (most) secure computation tasks
- Properties of any such definition
 - Well-defined adversary model
 - Well-defined execution setting
 - Security guarantees are clear and simple to understand

Modeling Adversaries



Adversarial behavior

- Semi-honest: follows the protocol specification
 - Tries to learn more than allowed by inspecting transcript
- Malicious: follows any arbitrary strategy
- Covert: follows any arbitrary strategy, but is averse to being caught...

Adversarial power

- Polynomial-time
- Computationally unbounded: information-theoretic security

Modeling Adversaries



Corruption strategy

- Static: the set of corrupted parties is fixed before the execution begins
- Adaptive: the adversary can corrupt parties during the execution, based on what has happened
 - Models modern "hacking"
 - Cannot use strategies that choose a small set of representatives to compute for all
 - In general, much harder!

Execution Setting



Stand-alone

 Consider a single protocol execution only (or that only a single execution is under attack)

Concurrent general composition

- Arbitrary protocols executed concurrently
- Realistic setting, very important model

Stand-alone vs composition

- Stand-alone: a good place to start studying secure computation, techniques and tools are helpful
- Composition: true goal for constructions

Feasibility of Secure Computation



- Assuming an honest majority, any functionality can be securely computed
 - Even information theoretically, and with adaptive security
- Without an honest majority, it is impossible to achieve fairness in general
 - Intuition behind proof of impossibility later
 - Current understanding of fairness
- Without an honest majority, any funct. can be securely computed without fairness

Preliminaries



Notations:

- Security parameter n
- We wish security to hold for all inputs of all lengths, as long as n is large enough
- Function μ is negligible: if for every polynomial $p(\cdot)$ there exists an N such that for all n>N we have μ (n) < 1/p(n)

Preliminaries



- Probability ensemble X={X(a,n)}
 - Infinite series, indexed by a string a and natural n
 - Each X(a,n) is a random variable
 - In our context: output of protocol execution with input a and security parameter n
 - Probability space: randomness of parties

Preliminaries



▶ Computational indistinguishability X ≈ Y

 For every (non-uniform) polynomial-time distinguisher D there exists a negligible function μ such that for every a and all large enough n's:

$$|Pr[D(X(a,n)=1]-Pr[D(Y(a,n)=1]| < \mu(n)$$

- Statistical closeness
 - The same but D is unbounded in running time

Notation



Functionality

- $f=(f_1,...,f_m)$: for input vector x, each $f_i(x)$ is a random variable (for probabilistic functionalities)
- Party P_i receives f_i
- We denote $(x,y) \rightarrow (f_1(x,y), f_2(x,y))$

Semi-Honest Adversaries



Simulation:

- Given input and output, can generate the adversary's view of a protocol execution
- Important: since parties follow protocol, the inputs are well defined

Semi-Honest Adversaries



- For every semi-honest A, there exists a simulator S such that for every set of corrupted parties I and every vector of inputs x, the following are *close*
 - The output of A, and the outputs of all parties after a protocol execution
 - The output of S given x_i and $f_i(x)$ for all $i \in I$, and all the values $f_1(x), ..., f_m(x)$

Security Levels




Defining "close"

- Computational security = computational indistinguishability
- Statistical security = statistical closeness
- Perfect security = identical distributions


Semi-Honest Adversaries





Semi-Honest Adversaries





Properties



- Correctness, independence of inputs, fairness are all non-issues in the semi-honest model
- Why is privacy guaranteed by this definition?
 - The adversary's view in an execution can be generated from the input and output only
 - If the adversary can compute something after a real protocol execution, it can compute it just from the input/output
 - Very similar to zero-knowledge

Joint Distribution



- A crucial point: need to consider the joint distribution of adversary's output and honest parties' output
- In the definition:
 - We compare the distribution of all inputs and outputs together with the adversary's output

Joint Distribution



- Example:
 - Functionality: A outputs random bit, B outputs nothing
 - B should clearly not learn A's output bit
 - Protocol: A chooses a random bit, outputs it, and sends the bit to B (who ignores it)
- This is simulatable when separately looking at distribution of B's view and actual outputs

Deterministic Functionalities



- In the case of deterministic functionalities, the outputs are fully determined by the inputs
- It suffices to separately prove
 - Correctness
 - Simulation: can generate view of semi-honest adversary (corrupted parties' view), given inputs and outputs only
 - This is significantly easier!

Malicious Adversaries



- First attempt: require the existence of a simulator that generates the adversary's view given the inputs/outputs of corrupted
- Problem: what are the inputs used by the adversary?
 - They are not necessarily those written on the input tape
 - They are not explicit: the adversary doesn't run the protocol but arbitrary code

Malicious Adversaries



- We also need to require independence of inputs, correctness, fairness etc.
 - These properties are not captured by "view simulation" alone
- Can we separate correctness and privacy?
 - Instead of computing f, compute a function that reveals first input bit of other party
 - Correctness or privacy???
- What about independence of inputs and privacy?

The Ideal/Real Paradigm



- What is the best we could hope for?
 - An incorruptible trusted party
 - All parties send inputs to trusted party (over perfectly secure communication lines)
 - Trusted party computes output
 - Trusted party sends each party its output (over perfectly secure communication lines)
 - This is an ideal world
- What can an adversary do?
 - Just choose its input...


The Ideal/Real Paradigm



- The real protocol must be like the ideal world
- Formalizing this notion:
 - For every adversary A attacking the real protocol, there exists an adversary S in the ideal model such that the output distributions (of all) are <u>close</u>
 - Computational indistinguishability, statistical closeness or identical distributions...
 - S simulates a real protocol execution while interacting in the ideal world
 - Here we always look at the joint output distribution

The Ideal/Real Paradigm





"Formal" Security Definition



- Protocol π securely computes a function f if:
 - For every non-uniform polynomial-time real-model adversary A, there exists a non-uniform polynomial-time ideal-model adversary S, such that for all input vectors and auxiliary inputs:
 - the joint outputs of **A** and the honest parties in a real execution of π is <u>indistinguishable</u>* from the joint outputs of **S** and the honest parties in an ideal execution where the trusted party

computes f

* Computationally indistinguishable, statistically close or identical distributions for computational, statistical and perfect security

Properties



The following properties hold

- Privacy: from adversary's outputs
- Correctness: from honest parties' outputs
- Independence of inputs: from ideal execution
- Fairness and guaranteed output delivery: from ideal execution

• More?



Relaxing the Ideal Model



- In some cases, this ideal model is too strong and cannot be achieved
- Fairness cannot be achieved in general without an honest majority
 - Consider two parties and consider removing the last message of the protocol execution
 - Works for coin tossing...



Relaxing the Ideal Model



- Change the instructions of the trusted party
 - Trusted party receives input from all parties
 - Trusted party sends corrupted parties' outputs to adversary
 - Adversary says "continue" or "halt"
 - If "continue", trusted party sends output to honest parties; else, it sends "abort"



Reactive Functionalities



- Functionalities that obtain inputs and provide outputs in stages
- Examples:
 - Mental poker
 - Commitment schemes
- This is also useful for relaxing ideal functionalities (give side information to S)
- The definition extends naturally to this as well

Advantages of This Approach



- General it captures ALL applications
- The specifics of an application are defined by its functionality, security is defined as above
- The security guarantees achieved are easily understood (because the ideal model is easily understood)
 - We can be confident that we did not "miss" any security requirements

Restricted vs General Functionalities



- When constructing protocol for general secure computation, it suffices to consider
 - Deterministic functionalities: to compute a probabilistic functionality f, define $g((x,r),(y,s))=f(x,y;r\oplus s)$
 - Single-output functionalities: encrypt and MAC the output of the other party
 - Non-reactive functionalities: to compute a reactive functionality, define a series of functions that input/output shared state information (with a MAC)



Sequential modular composition:

 Secure protocols are run sequentially, with arbitrary messages sent in between them

Why consider this?

- An important security goal within itself
- Very helpful (if not crucial) tool for analyzing the security of protocols

Formalization – Hybrid Model

- A trusted party helps to compute a sub-functionality
- REAL messages & IDEAL messages



- Subprotocols ρ_i securely compute functionalities f_i
- Protocol π securely computes g in a hybrid model where a trusted party is used to compute every f_i
 - This is much easier to analyze since each f_i is effectively "perfectly secure"
- Theorem: assuming the above, the real protocol π^{ρ} that uses real calls to each ρ_i instead of a trusted party for f_i , securely computes g.



Proof Sketch

- Assume that a protocol π with a single call to f securely computes g
- Assume that π^{ρ} is not secure; an adversary **A** breaks the protocol (with **D** that distinguishes real from ideal)
- We construct an adversary A' and distinguisher D' to attack ρ
- A' receives as auxiliary input the execution prefix of π until ρ begins, that matches the inputs given in ρ
- After the execution, D' receives the outputs of all, and uses the auxiliary input to complete the execution of π
- D' runs D and outputs whatever it does



Proof Sketch

- If D' received the output of an ideal execution of f, then the output is the same as D after an ideal execution of g
 - This is by the proof of security of π in the hybrid model
- If D' received the output of a real execution of ρ , then the output is the same as D after a real execution of π^{ρ}
- Since D distinguishes between ideal-g and real- π^{ρ} it follows that D' distinguishes between ideal-f and real- ρ



Concurrent Composition



- We have considered the stand-alone model
 - This implies sequential composition
- What about concurrent composition?
 - An Internet-like setting where many (arbitrary, secure and insecure) protocols are run concurrently, with the adversary controlling the scheduling
- This models the real-world setting more accurately
 - We don't know what the result is of running stand-alone protocols concurrently with related inputs

Concurrent Composition



- Concurrent general composition
 - Strictly harder than the stand-alone model
 - Impossible without some trusted set-up assumption (like a common reference string)
- The UC definition (universal composability) guarantees security in this setting
 - Efficient UC security is a special challenge...
- Recommended to study UC next, after studying the stand-alone setting



Relaxed Definitions



- In order to achieve high efficiency, sometimes can consider weaker definitions
 - Semi-honest (but this is very weak)
 - Covert adversaries: adversary may be malicious but is guaranteed to be caught cheating with good probability
 - Suitable where adversaries can be penalized for being caught cheating (e.g., business loss)
 - Privacy only (malicious)
 - Problematic...

Defining Privacy Only



Defining privacy only is very difficult

- No correctness and independence of inputs, but as we have seen it is hard to separate these properties
- Composition is not guaranteed

Example:

- Function f with the property that for every x, there exists a y (denoted y_x) such that $f(x,y_x)=x$
- If P₂ can input y_x implicitly, then it can learn x

Private OT



- Oblivious transfer
 - Sender: has two strings x_0, x_1
 - Receiver: has a choice bit b
 - Outputs: sender learns nothing about b, receiver learns only of x_0, x_1
- For oblivious transfer, we know how to define privacy only, for two-round protocols
 - Fortunately we also have such protocols

Private OT



Why do 2 rounds help?

- Receiver sends one message
- Sender replies with one message

Privacy for a malicious sender

- Just need to prove indistinguishability of receiver's first message when b=0 and when b=1
- This can be extended to many messages

Privacy for a malicious receiver

- First message is generated before seeing anything
- Require that for every first message, there exists a bit b' such that receiver learns nothing about x_{b'}

Semi-Honest vs Malicious



- Now to confuse you all...
- It is clear that any protocol that is secure in the presence of malicious adversaries is secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries
 - A malicious adversary is stronger, and can always behave semi-honestly...
- But, the simulator in the ideal model is also stronger
 - It can change its input
- Does this make a difference?

Semi-Honest vs Malicious



- Consider the AND function where only P₂ receives output
- Consider the following protocol:
 - P₁ sends its input directly to P₂
- Is the protocol secure?
 - Corrupted P₁ learns nothing and gives its input directly, so clearly secure
 - Semi-honest P_2 learns P_1 's input which doesn't happen if P_2 's input is $0 \Rightarrow$ not secure!
 - Malicious P₂: in the ideal model, simulator can always give input 1 and simulate ⇒ secure!

Semi-Honest vs Malicious



Fixing this absurdity

- Allow a semi-honest adversary to also change its input
- Arguably, this is legitimate (to choose input)
- This is called augmented semi-honest
 - Note: this stronger notion is also needed for the GMW compilation (this afternoon)

Theorem:

 Security for malicious adversaries implies security for augmented semi-honest adversaries

Summary



- Semi-honest: simulator given input/output generates the adversary's view
 - Probabilistic functionalities must consider joint distribution of view and outputs
 - Deterministic functionalities: easier, suffices to separately consider correctness and view simulation
- Malicious: ideal-real simulation
- Sequential composition
- Advanced topics
 - Concurrent composition
 - Relaxed definition
 - Semi-honest vs malicious