# Session 3: The GMW and BMR Multi-Party Protocols

Benny Pinkas
Bar-Ilan University

#### **Overview**

- The GMW (Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson) protocol
  - In this lecture we only cover security against semihonest adversaries
  - # rounds depends on circuit depth
  - O. Goldreich, Foundations of Cryptography, Vol. II, Chapter 7.
- Oblivious Transfer (OT) is extensively used in the GMW protocol
  - OT extension is a method that greatly reduces the overhead of OT

# The setting (for GMW protocol)

- Parties  $P_1,...,P_n$
- Inputs  $X_1,...,X_n$  (bits, but can be easily generalized)
- Outputs  $y_1,...,y_n$
- The functionality is described as a Boolean circuit.
  - Wlog, uses only XOR (+) and AND gates
  - These gates correspond to +, \* modulo 2.
  - Wires are ordered so that if wire k is a function of wires i and j, then i<k and j<k.</li>

## The setting

- The adversary controls a subset of the parties
  - This subset is defined before the protocol begins (is "non-adaptive")
  - We will not cover the adaptive case
- Communication
  - Synchronous
  - Private channels between any pair of parties (can be easily implemented using encryption)

#### **Adversarial models**

We will cover the semi-honest case

- If adversaries can be malicious but do not abort
  - GMW: A protocol secure against any number of malicious parties
- If adversaries can be malicious and can also abort
  - GMW: A protocol secure against a minority of malicious parties with abort (will not be discussed here)

## Protocol for semi-honest setting

#### The protocol in a nutshell:

- Each party shares its input bit
- Scan the circuit gate by gate
  - Input values of gate are shared by the parties
  - Run a protocol computing a sharing of the output value of the gate
  - Repeat
- Publish outputs

## Protocol for semi-honest setting

#### The protocol:

- Each party shares its input bit
- The sharing procedure:
  - P<sub>i</sub> has input bit x<sub>i</sub>
  - It chooses random bits r<sub>i,i</sub> for all i≠j.
  - Sends bit  $r_{i,j}$  to  $P_i$ .
  - Sets its own share to be  $r_{i,i} = x_i + (\sum_{j \neq i} r_{i,j}) \mod 2$
  - Therefore  $\Sigma_{j=1...n} r_{i,j} = x_i \mod 2$ .
- Now every P<sub>j</sub> has n shares, one for each input x<sub>i</sub> of each P<sub>i</sub>.

# **Evaluating the circuit**

- Scan circuit by the order of wires
- Wire c is a function of wires a,b
  - ▶ P<sub>i</sub> has shares a<sub>i</sub>, b<sub>i</sub>. Must get share c<sub>i</sub> of c.



- Addition (xor) gate:
  - $\triangleright$  P<sub>i</sub> computes c<sub>i</sub>=a<sub>i</sub>+b<sub>i</sub>.
- ► Indeed,  $c = a+b \pmod{2} = (a_1+...+a_n) + (b_1+...+b_n) = (a_1+b_1)+...+(a_n+b_n) = c_1+...+c_n$

## **Evaluating multiplication (AND) gates**

- $c = a \cdot b = (a_1 + ... + a_n) \cdot (b_1 + ... + b_n) = \sum_{i=1...n} a_i b_i + \sum_{i \neq j} a_i b_j = \sum_{i=1...n} a_i b_i + \sum_{1 \leq i < j \leq n} (a_i b_j + a_j b_i) \mod 2$
- $P_i$  will obtain a share of  $a_i b_i + \sum_{i \neq j} (a_i b_j + a_j b_i)$
- Computing a<sub>i</sub>b<sub>i</sub> by P<sub>i</sub> is easy
- What about a<sub>i</sub>b<sub>i</sub> + a<sub>i</sub>b<sub>i</sub>?
- P<sub>i</sub> and P<sub>j</sub> run the following protocol for every (i,j)

## **Evaluating multiplication gates**

- Input: P<sub>i</sub> has a<sub>i</sub>,b<sub>i</sub>, P<sub>j</sub> has a<sub>j</sub>,b<sub>j</sub>.
- P<sub>i</sub> outputs a<sub>i</sub>b<sub>j</sub>+a<sub>j</sub>b<sub>i</sub>+s<sub>i,j</sub>. P<sub>j</sub> outputs s<sub>i,j</sub>.
- P<sub>j</sub>:
  - Chooses a random s<sub>i,i</sub>
  - Computes the four possible outcomes of  $a_ib_j+a_jb_i+s_{i,j}$ , depending on the four options for  $P_i$ 's inputs.
  - Sets these values to be its input to a 1-out-of-4 OT
- P<sub>i</sub> is the receiver, with input 2a<sub>i</sub>+b<sub>i</sub>.

## Recovering the output bits

The protocol computes shares of the output wires

 Each party sends its share of an output wire to the party P<sub>i</sub> that should learn that output

 P<sub>i</sub> can then sum the shares, obtain the value and output it

# **Proof of Security**

- Recall definition of security for semi-honest setting:
  - Simulation Given input and output, can generate the adversary's view of a protocol execution.

- Suppose that an adversary controls the set J of all parties but P<sub>i</sub>.
- The simulator is given  $(x_j, y_j)$  for all  $P_j \in J$ .

#### The simulator

- Shares of input wires: ∀j∈J choose
  - a random share  $r_{j,i}$  to be sent from  $P_j$  to  $P_i$ ,
  - and a random share  $r_{i,j}$  to be sent from  $P_i$  to  $P_j$ .
- Shares of multiplication gate wires:
  - − ∀j<i, choose a random bit as the value learned in the 1out-of-4 OT.
  - −  $\forall$ j>i, choose a random s<sub>i,j</sub>, and set the four inputs of the OT accordingly.
- Output wire  $y_j$  of  $j \in J$ : set the message received from  $P_i$  as the XOR of  $y_i$  and the shares of that wire held by  $P_i \in J$ .

# **Security proof**

- The output of the simulation is distributed identically to the view in the real protocol
  - Certainly true for the random shares  $r_{i,j}$ ,  $r_{j,i}$  sent from and to  $P_i$ .
  - OT for j<i: output is random, as in the real protocol.</li>
  - OT for j<i: input to the OT defined as in the real protocol.</li>
  - Output wires: message from P<sub>i</sub> distributed as in the real protocol.

#### QED



#### **Performance**

- Must run an OT for every multiplication gate
  - Namely, public key operations per multiplication gate
  - Need a communication round between all parties per every multiplication gate
  - Can process together a set of multiplication gates if all their input wires are already shared
  - Therefore number of rounds is O(d), where d is the depth of the circuit (counting only multiplication gates).

## **Oblivious Transfer Extension**

#### **Oblivious Transfer**

- Oblivious Transfer (OT)
  - Sender  $(P_1)$  has two inputs  $x_0, x_1$
  - Receiver (P<sub>2</sub>) has an input bit s
  - Receiver learns x<sub>s</sub>

- Variant: random OT
  - Sender  $(P_1)$  has two inputs  $x_0, x_1$
  - For a randomly chosen bit s, receiver learns  $(x_s,s)$

# **Efficiency of Oblivious Transfer**

- OT is very efficient, but still requires exponentiations per transfer
  - When doing thousands (or millions) of OTs, this will become very costly
- Protocols for secure computation typically use
   OTs per gate or per input bit

• Impagliazzo and Rudich 1989: there is no blackbox construction of OT from OWF ⊗


#### **Oblivious Transfer Extensions**

- An OT extension is a protocol that:
  - Uses a "small" number of base OTs (e.g., 128)
  - Uses cheap symmetric crypto to achieve many OTs (e.g., millions)
  - This is like hybrid encryption
- Note that it's not clear that this is even possible!

#### **Beaver's OT Extension**

#### A theoretical construction

- The number of OTs in Yao's protocol depends only on evaluator's input
- Computing the circuit requires only n OTs but provides  $m \gg n$  effective OTs



## Random vs Regular OT

- Beaver's protocol computes a random OT
  - $-P_2$  is the receiver. Its input bit s is randomly chosen.
  - $-P_1$  is the sender. It has a pair of input bits  $(r_0,r_1)$ .
  - $-P_2$  learns the bit  $r_s$ .

# Random vs Regular OT

- We can construct regular OT from random OT (where both parties inputs are random)
  - $-P_1$ 's input:  $(x_0, x_1)$   $P_2$ 's input:  $\sigma$
  - Parties run random OT on bits  $(r_0, r_1)$  and s
    - $P_2$  receives  $s, r_s$
  - $-P_2$  sends  $t = s \oplus \sigma$  to  $P_1$  (essentially tells  $P_1$  the order in which  $P_1$  should mask its inputs).
  - $-P_1$  sends  $y_0 = x_0 \oplus r_t$  and  $y_1 = x_1 \oplus r_{1-t}$
  - $-P_2$  outputs  $y_{\sigma} \oplus r_{s}$

# Random vs Regular OT

#### Correctness:


- If  $s = \sigma$  then t = 0 and so  $y_0 = x_0 \oplus r_0$  and  $y_1 = x_1 \oplus r_1$ 
  - In this case  $y_{\sigma} \oplus r_{s} = x_{\sigma}$
- If  $s \neq \sigma$  then t=1 and so  $y_0=x_0 \oplus r_1$  and  $y_1=x_1 \oplus r_0$ 
  - In this case , too,  $y_{\sigma} \oplus r_{s} = x_{\sigma}$

#### Privacy:

- $-P_1$  sees only a random bit t and so learns nothing about  $\sigma$
- $-P_2$  can learn one of  $(r_0, r_1)$  and so only one of  $(x_0, x_1)$

- A protocol for extending n OTs to m OTs
  - By Ishai, Kilian, Nissim and Petrank
- Sender's input:  $(x_1^0, x_1^1), ..., (x_m^0, x_m^1)$
- Receiver's input:  $\sigma = \sigma_1, ..., \sigma_m$
- First phase:
  - Receiver samples random strings  $T_1$ , ...,  $T_n$  each of length m
  - Receiver prepares pairs  $(T_i, T_i \oplus \sigma)$  and plays sender in OT
  - Sender chooses random  $s = s_1, ..., s_n$
  - Sender plays receiver with input  $s_i$  Note: roles in these n OTs are reversed!







$$Q_i = \begin{cases} T_i & \text{if } s_i = 0 \\ T_i \oplus \sigma & \text{if } s_i = 1 \end{cases}$$





$$Q_i = \begin{cases} T_i & \text{if } s_i = 0 \\ T_i \bigoplus \sigma & \text{if } s_i = 1 \end{cases}$$






$$Q_i = \begin{cases} T_i & \text{if } s_i = 0 \\ T_i \bigoplus \sigma & \text{if } s_i = 1 \end{cases}$$






- If  $\sigma_1 = 0$  then the first row of Q equals the first row of T (whatever s equals)
- If  $\sigma_1 = 1$  then the first row of Q equals the first row of T XORed with s:
  - If  $s_i = 0$ , then equals the first entry in  $T_i$
  - If  $s_i = 1$ , then equals the first entry in  $T_i \oplus 1$  (since XORed with  $\sigma_1$ )
  - In both cases, obtain XOR with s

$$Q_i = \begin{cases} T_i & \text{if } s_i = 0 \\ T_i \bigoplus \sigma & \text{if } s_i = 1 \end{cases}$$





- If  $\sigma_2 = 0$  then the **second** row of Q equals the **second** row of T (whatever S equals)
- If  $\sigma_2 = 1$  then the **second** row of Q equals the **second** row of T XORed with s:
  - If  $s_i = 0$ , then equals the first entry in  $T_i$
  - If  $s_i = 1$ , then equals the first entry in  $T_i \oplus 1$  (since XORed with  $\sigma_1$ )
- In both cases, obtain XOR with s

- Using n base OTs, the matrix is transferred
- Look at each row separately (there are m rows)
  - For the *i*th row; denote Q(i) and T(i)
    - If  $\sigma_i = 0$  then T(i) = Q(i)
    - If  $\sigma_i = 1$  then  $T(i) = Q(i) \oplus s$
- To carry out the ith transfer (phase 2 of the protocol)
  - Sender sends  $y_i^0 = H(i, Q(i)) \oplus x_i^0$  and  $y_i^1 = H(i, Q(i) \oplus s) \oplus x_i^1$
  - Receiver computes  $x_i^{\sigma_i} = H(i, T(i)) \oplus y_i^{\sigma}$
- Correctness
  - If  $\sigma_i = 0$  then T(i) = Q(i) and so result is correct
  - If  $\sigma_i = 1$  then  $T(i) = Q(i) \oplus s$  and so result is correct

## **Efficient OT Extension – Security**

#### Corrupted sender

- The sender receives either  $T_i$  or  $T_i \oplus \sigma$
- Since  $T_i$  is random, this reveals nothing about  $\sigma$

## **Efficient OT Extension – Security**

#### Corrupted receiver

- The sender's values are masked by H(i,Q(i)) and  $H(i,Q(i) \oplus s)$
- The receiver has H(i,T(i)) which equals one of them but does not know anything about s (sender's queries in base Ots)
  - In the ROM, without knowing s cannot query the value
  - Can also prove assuming that  $r_1, ..., r_m, H(s \oplus r_1), ..., H(s \oplus r_m)$  is pseudorandom
  - Note that the receiver knows  $r_1, ..., r_m$  but not s, and  $H(s \oplus r_i)$  masks the ith value that the receiver should **not** receive

# **Complexity of OT extension**

- Run n oblivious transfers (costing a few exponentiations each)
- Each actual OT costs a few hash operations
- This is very efficient and can be used to carry out millions of OTs per second
  - [Asharov,Lindell,Schneider,Zohner ACM CCS 2013]
- Malicious adversaries: more later in the winter school