
Private Learning - 2



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Bar-Ilan Winter School on Differential Privacy February 2017

Pure-Privately Learning Points

| • | Concept class: | C = | $POINT_d$ | = | $\{c_1,$ | $, c_{2d}$ |
|---|----------------|-----|-----------|---|----------|------------|
|---|----------------|-----|-----------|---|----------|------------|

| х | 1 | 2 | ••• | <i>i</i> -1 | i | <i>i</i> +1 | ••• | |
|----------|---|---|-----|-------------|---|-------------|-----|---|
| $c_i(x)$ | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 1 | 0 | | 0 |

- Recall: Proper point learner with O(1) samples
- Generic construction of private learners results in O(log |C|) = O(d) samples
 - Is the gap essential?
- Thm 1 [BKN 10]: Proper pure-private PAC learner of Points must use $\Omega\left(\frac{\mathrm{d}}{\epsilon}\right)$ samples.
- Proof:
 - PAC learning: On database

| X | i | i | i |
|------|---|---|-------|
| c(x) | 1 | 1 | 1 |

learner must return c_i w.p. > 1/2

• Pure Differential Privacy: By group privacy, learner must return c_i with probability $\geq e^{-\epsilon n}$ on

| database | х | 1 | 1 | | 1 |
|----------|------|---|---|-----|---|
| databasc | c(x) | 1 | 1 | ••• | 1 |

- There are 2^d-1 options for i \neq 1, hence need $(2^d-1)\cdot e^{-\epsilon n}<1/2$. Hence, $n=\Omega\left(\frac{d}{\epsilon}\right)$.
- Can we do better?

An improper private learner for POINT_d [BKN10, BNS14]

- Choose a family of $m = O(\frac{1}{\alpha})$ hypotheses H as follows:
 - Construct h_i by setting $h_i(x)=1$ with probability $\frac{\alpha}{4}$ and $h_i(x)=0$ otherwise.
 - Let $H = \{h_i\}$
 - Efficiency: enough if entries of h_i are pairwise independent
- Use exponential mechanism to choose $h \in H$ with small error
 - This would work well if H contains a hypothesis with error $\frac{\alpha}{2}$

Note: We apply generic construction on H instead of POINTd

- Fix $c_i \in POINT_d$ and a distribution P on $\{0,1\}^d$
- Claim: w.p. $\geq \frac{1}{2}$ H contains h_i s.t. $error_P(c_j, h_i) \leq \frac{\alpha}{2}$.
- Proof:
 - $E[error_P(c_j, h_i)|h_i(j) = 1] \leq \frac{\alpha}{4}$.
 - By Markov's inequality $\Pr\left[error_P(c_j,h_i)>\frac{\alpha}{2}\left|h_i(j)=1\right]\leq \frac{1}{2}$.
 - $\Pr\left[error_P\left(c_j,h_i\right) \leq \frac{\alpha}{2}\right] \geq \Pr\left[h_i(j) = 1\right] \Pr\left[error(h_i) \leq \frac{\alpha}{2} \middle| h_i(j) = 1\right] \geq \frac{\alpha}{8}.$
 - H fails to contain h_i s.t. $error_P(c_j, h_i) \leq \frac{\alpha}{2}$ w.p. $\leq \left(1 \frac{\alpha}{8}\right)^m \leq \frac{1}{2}$ if $m > O(\frac{1}{\alpha})$

Representation of concept classes [BNS13]

- Probabilistic Representation for class C: a list of hypothesis classes H_1, \dots, H_r s.t.
 - for every $c \in \mathcal{C}$ and distribution P over examples,
 - w.p. $\frac{3}{4}$, a randomly chosen H_i contains a hypothesis h s.t. $error_p(c,h) \leq \frac{1}{4}$.
 - The size of Rep is defined as $\max_{i} \log |H_i|$
- RepDim(C): the size of C's minimal probabilistic representation
- Theorem [BNS13]: $\Theta(RepDim(\mathcal{C}))$ samples are necessary and sufficient for pure-privately learning \mathcal{C} (improperly)

| Concept class | learner | Sample complexity (pure DP) | Sample complexity (approx DP) |
|---------------|----------|--------------------------------------|--|
| C | Proper | $O(\log C)$ [KLNRS'08] | |
| | Improper | $\Theta(RepDim(C))$ [BNS'13] | |
| points | Proper | $\Theta(\log(T))$ [KLNRS'08, BKN'10] | $\Theta(1)$ [BNS'14] |
| | Improper | Θ(1) [BKN'10, BNS'13] | |
| thresholds | Proper | $\Theta(\log(T))$ [KLNRS'08, BKN'10] | $2^{O(\log^* T)}$ [BNS'14], $\Omega(\log^* T)$ [BNSV'15] |
| | Improper | $\Theta(\log(T))$ [FX'13] | |

Back to Example 0: Learning points with approx. differential privacy

A_{dist} by Smith & Thakurtha:

• Inputs:

- A set of possible solutions *F*
- Database $S \in X^*$
- Sensitivity-1 quality function $q: X^* \times F \to \mathbb{R}$


Algorithm:

- 1) Let $f_1 \neq f_2$ be two highest score solutions in F, where $q(S, f_1) \geq q(S, f_2)$
- 2) Compute $gap(S)=q(S,f_1)-q(S,f_2)$ and $gap^*=gap(S)+Lap\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon}\right)$
- 3) If $gap^* < \frac{1}{\epsilon}\log\left(\frac{1}{\delta}\right)$ then output \perp and halt. Otherwise, output f_1

Back to Example 0: Learning points with approx. differential privacy

- Given a labeled sample $S = (x_i, y_i)_{i=1}^m$, define the quality of a domain element $z \in X$ as:
 - $q(S,z) = |\{i : (x_i = z) \text{ and } (y_i = 1)\}|$
- Learner for Points [BNS'14]
 - Execute A_{dist} on S and q.
 - If returned \bot , output a random $h \in POINT_d$.
 - Else, if a domain element j was returned, then return $h=c_{j}$.

Back to Learning Thresholds



- Why?
 - Seems fundamental and simple
 - "should not be too hard", disturbing difference between private and non-private setting

0123...

- [BNSV'15] Equivalent under differential privacy to:
 - Distribution learning:
 - D unknown distrib over X with cumulative F_D
 - Goal: Given oracle access to D, find F: X \rightarrow [0,1] with small $|F(x)-F_D(x)|$ for all $x \in X$
 - Query release:
 - Given points $(x_1,...,x_n) \in X$, output data structure approximating $|\{i: x_i < z\}|/n$ for all $z \in X$
 - (Approximate) Median:
 - Given points $(x_1,...,x_n) \in X$, output z such that (approx.) half the points are smaller/greater than z
 - Interior point:
 - Given points $(x_1,...,x_n) \in X$, output z between min and max points


Solving Interior Point with Approx DP Requires $\Omega(log*T)$ Samples [BNVS'15]

• Observe: Impossible to have n = 1 when $T \ge 2$



- Strategy: Induction
 - Approx. dp mechanism M for solving IP over T(n+1) w/ n+1 samples
 - → Approx. dp mechanism M' for solving IP over T(n) w/ n samples
 - Where $T(n+1) = b(n)^{T(n)}$

Solving Interior Point with Approx DP Requires $\Omega(\log^*T)$ Samples[BNVS'15]



If M approx private so is M'

- Suppose M succeeds
 - $z_0, z_1, ..., z_n$ all share a prefix of length $\min(x_1, ..., x_n)$ and hence \tilde{z} also shares this prefix with z_0
 - Hence, $\tilde{x} \ge \min(x_1, ..., x_n)$
- Let $w = \max(x_1, ..., x_n)$
 - If $\tilde{x} > w$ then \tilde{z} reveals y_0^{w+1}
 - By approx. privacy, this can happen with probability at most $\frac{e^{\epsilon}}{b} + \delta$

Privacy used for claiming correctness

Variations on a the PPAC learning model

Pure-privacy, proper

Generic construction, but exhibits higher sample complexity than in non-private learning

Pure-privacy, improper

- Characterization of sample complexity in terms of randomized representation
- Limited gain in sample complexity (POINTS but not THREHOLD)

Approximate privacy, proper

- Mostly not well understood
- Improved sample complexity (POINTS and THRESHOLD, but cannot learn THRESHOLD over the reals)

Label privacy

- Significantly weaker notion of privacy (label protected but not sample)
- Characterization of sample complexity in terms of VC dimension

Semi-Supervised learning


- Some examples labeled, most are not
- Characterization of labeled sample complexity in terms of VC dimension

Semi-Supervised Learning [BNS'15]

- Input: batches of labeled and unlabeled samples
- Generic construction: Every finite concept class C can be learned privately using $O(\operatorname{VC}(C))$ labeled examples.
 - The construction uses $O(\log |C|)$ unlabeled examples
- Boosting the labeled sample complexity: Given a private learner for a concept class C, it is possible to reduce its labeled sample complexity to O(VC(C)).
 - While maintaining the unlabeled sample complexity

Reducing the labeled sample complexity of a given learner A

- Base learner \mathcal{A} with sample complexity n.
- Input: Database S of size n, partially labeled
- Let H be the set of all dichotomies over S realized by the target concept class C
- 2. Choose $h \in H$ using the exponential mechanism with the <u>labeled portion</u> of S
- 3. Relabel S using h,
- 4. Execute *A*



Reducing the labeled sample complexity of a given learner \mathcal{A}

- Base learner \mathcal{A} with sample complexity n.
- Input: Database S of size n, partially labeled

- $\exists f \in H \text{ s.t. } error_S(f)$
- Let **H** be the set of all dichotomies over **S** realized by the target concept class C
- 2. Choose $h \in H$ using the exponential mechanism with the **labeled portion** of **S**
- 3. Relabel S using h,

A returns a hypothesis that is close to h

4. Execute A

If S contains $\approx VC(C) \log |S|$ labeled exampless then h is close to the target concept

Reducing the labeled sample complexity of a given learner A

- Base learner \mathcal{A} with sample complexity n.
- Input: Database S of size n, partially labeled
- Let H be the set of all dichotomies over S realized by the target concept class C
- 2. Choose $h \in H$ using the exponential mechanism with the labeled portion of S
- 3. Relabel *S* using *h*

4. Execute A

Solution:


use h to relabel sample, analyze distribution of relabeled databases

Difficulty:

H depends on S!
Outputting h would breach privacy!

Thresholds and Computational Complexity [Bun-Zhandry'15]

- Order Revealing Encryption:
- Learn {<, >, =} but nothing else
- Efficiently learnable, but not efficiently privately learnable



Thanks: Mark Bun

Epilog: why study private learning?

- Real-world implementations of learning algorithms can lead to loss of privacy
 - Recall Vitaly Shmatikov's talks!
 - Carefully distinguish privacy breaches from doing science
 - McSherry's "secrets about you" vs. "your secrets"
- Learning: a basic task that abstracts many of the computations performed on collections of private individual data
 - Hence, important to understand to what extent it can be done under the restriction of differential privacy
- A test bed for many ideas (e.g., how to circumvent sample complexity bounds)
- Learning intimately related with differential privacy
 - Learning theory tools useful for privacy [BLR'08, HR'10]
 - Differential privacy implies generalization [McSherry, DFHPRR'15, BNSSU'15]
 - Useful even when privacy is not the goal!

What have we Learned?

- PAC learning exhibits a lot of complexity under differential privacy
 - Even for simple complexity classes like points and thresholds
 - A variety of applicable strategies, quite a full picture
 - Still open: improper learning and characterization of sample complexity under approx. privacy
 - Crypto used for showing hardness (fingerprinting codes, order-revealing encryption)
 - But can it be used positively?

Some more references

- Synthetic data
 - <u>Avrim Blum</u>, Katrina Ligett, <u>Aaron Roth</u>: A learning theory approach to noninteractive database privacy. <u>STOC 2008</u>
- Boosting
 - Cynthia Dwork, Guy N. Rothblum, Salil P. Vadhan: Boosting and Differential Privacy. FOCS 2010
- Continuous domains:
 - Kamalika Chaudhuri, <u>Daniel J. Hsu</u>: Sample Complexity Bounds for Differentially Private Learning. <u>COLT 2011</u>
- Other machine learning
 - See Adam's talk